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"All that I aim at is, that there may remain for the benefit of
this present age, as well as of posterity, some certain records and
monuments of the first beginnings and fatal progress of [the Irish]
rebellion [of 1641], together with the horrid cruelties most
unmercifully exercised by the Irish rebels upon the British and
protestants within this kingdom of Ireland."
Sir John Temple, Knight, Master of the Rolls, and member of the
Privy Council within the Kingdom of Ireland, 1646.
With this statement, Sir John Temple forever shaped the history of Ireland and the Irish
people. His words, documenting the Irish rebellion of 1641, acted as a critically important voice
in justifying the horrific and brutal repression of the rebellion. Even beyond that, Temple’s
coverage of the Irish uprising, particularly its beginnings in Ulster province, influenced the
English government’s policies towards Ireland and the English people’s animosity towards the
Irish for generations. Considering the long-lasting, far-reaching impact of Temple’s works and
his statement that he wanted only to create “some certain records…of [the] rebellion” and only
“for the benefit of [the] present age, as well as of [its] posterity,” it is a deep misfortune of
history that such an influential work was so horribly misleading. Temple’s English bias
throughout his coverage of the uprising created a picture that was terribly skewed and no doubt
to the long misunderstanding in English society of the Irish people’s motives for and actions in
rebelling. Worse still, Temple’s work can still misinform contemporary readers about the events
of the 1641 revolt if they are not careful to examine this work explicitly within its context. When
placed within its greater historical context, Temple’s work is an invaluable tool for examining
any number of historical subjects, including the history of English-Irish relations. Therefore, one
must examine all of Temple’s claims against the Irish and the relevant background information
of the time to determine what nuggets of truth are buried underneath the layers of Temple’s
nationalistic and religious prejudices.
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An Englishman born in Ireland, Temple served in various political positions there from
the 1640s to the 1650s. He was sometimes an unpopular and controversial figure; in 1643, James
Butler, the Marquis of Ormond, forcibly removed Temple from his position as a Member of
Parliament and imprisoned him for supporting the English parliament over the king, Charles II.1
However, his most influential legacy emerged because of the Ulster rebellion in 1641. Temple
resided in Ireland during the time of the uprising, and it left a deep and lasting imprint on his
view of the native Irish. Indeed, the Ulster uprising inspired him to write his four hundred and
twelve page account of the rebellion five years after the event. Temple used his position as
master of the rolls in 1646 to gain access to various sources concerning the insurrection,
including the 3,140 sworn depositions taken from Protestant survivors of Irish attacks. 2 These
depositions would form the core of his History of the General Rebellion in Ireland. One of the
few contemporary accounts of the Ulster rising, Temple’s History became the official
interpretation of events for English readers, and it was considered key evidence of the
untrustworthiness of the Catholic Irish.
There are, however, serious problems with the History, including the fact that it was
intended to gain support for the use of military force in a reconquest of Ireland. Force, Temple
argued, was necessary, because the Irish had intended to “raise strong armies to invade and
conquer England” as a part of the uprising in 1641.3 Temple’s work shows an obvious English
bias in the way he analyzes the events surrounding 1641. Among his claims, Temple asserts that
the revolt was designed well before it occurred and always included plans to massacre English
Protestants. He also charges the Irish rebels with an inhuman level of cruelty against their
helpless English victims. Finally, he rejects any claim that the Irish might have been provoked
into mutinying, instead accusing the Irish of “endeavor[ing] to raise some ground or belief that
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they had just cause to enter into so desperate a rebellion.”4 Indeed, he finds the thought of the
Irish having a just cause to rebel so ludicrous that he mocks the very idea: “[The Irish Catholics]
speak as if their oppressions might be paralleled to the Isrealitish envassalage [subjection;
slavery] in the land of Egypt, and their persecutions, for religion equal to those of primitive
times…”5 The History of the General Rebellion in Ireland was, thus, widely circulated as
propaganda against the Irish in times of crisis in England.6
However, in the time since Temple wrote, the blinders of English patriotism have fallen
away, allowing for a reexamination of the events of the Ulster rising. This reexamination reveals
that Temple’s description of the events of 1641 is not entirely true. By investigating available
sources, one sees that the insurrection, though planned, did not have the level of premeditation
that Temple asserts. Neither were the violent attacks against the English and Scottish settlers in
Ireland a part of the plan, at least according to the men who originally devised it. Further,
scrutiny of the years leading up the 1641 rebellion show that the Irish had more legitimate cause
to fight than Temple gives them. Lastly, investigation of English responses to Irish aggression
shows that the English were not the innocent, helpless victims that Temple would have readers
believe. These facts are best evinced by examining the rebellion of 1641 through three main
stages: provocation, premeditation, and pandemonium.
Provocation: the conditions of Ireland in the years leading up to 1641
In the seventeenth century, land and the Catholic faith were the lifeblood of Ireland, and
the native Irish gentry were willing to die to preserve them. They perceived James I’s Irish land
policies as particularly devastating. In 1607, several prominent Catholic landowners were forced
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to flee Ireland after the imposition of English law and custom.1 Within a decade of their flight,
James I would confiscate their lands (over 3,800,000 acres in Ulster alone) and redistribute it
among English and Scottish settlers, Crown officials, the established Anglican Church, and even
the City of London, whose financial support of James’ Irish plantations was critical. By 1618,
Ireland was overrun with 40,000 Scottish settlers alone.7 The confiscation and redistribution of
Irish land was known as the transplantation system. Its purpose, according to Richard Lawrence,
a radical Baptist officer, was first, “to punish the Irish for rebellion and murder for the [times]
past,” second, “to settle Ireland for the future,” and third, to protect English interests and subjects
from “inhuman usage and destruction” at the hands of Irish Catholics.8 It was certainly
successful in the first regard. The transplantation system slowly stripped the Irish of their rights
and privileges and their means of making a living.
This elimination crossed all social and economic class boundaries; it even served to unite
parties that had traditionally opposed one another. For centuries, the native Irish had not been the
only inhabitants in Ireland. A separate group also lived in the land, known as the Old English. At
the time of the rebellion, the common understanding of the term, “Old English” was anyone who
descended from those who had colonized Ireland, beginning in the period of the Norman
invasions (the late 12th century) and continuing approximately until the introduction of the
Protestant Reformation in Ireland.9 At first, this division was primarily historical, racial, and
demographic, evinced by the settlement patterns of the Old English as opposed to that of the
Irish. The greatest concentrations of the Old English for centuries had been in the urban counties,
such as Dublin, Meath, Louth, Kildare, and Kilkenny, where the original Norman settlements
and the English presence had been strongest.10
1

The flight of the Irish Catholic lords was likely also precipitated by the failure of a plot formed by Hugh O’Neill,
Earl of Tyrone, Rory O’Donnell, Earl of Tyrconnell, and Hugh Maguire to capture Dublin Castle in 1607.
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The Old English were further distinguished from the native Irish in the nature of their
interests in Ireland and the approaches that the Old English used to further those interests. For
example, the settlement pattern of the Old English had created a distinctive buffer zone between
the native Irish and the English government. However, English authorities had ignored years of
pleas from the Old English for protection from their Irish enemies. As a result, the Old English
worked to establish a pseudo-independence from the English government by placing themselves
outside of strict English control while at the same time fighting tensions with the native Irish.11
With fewer royalist restrictions on their behavior, the Old English were free to solve their
problems with the Irish in any manner they chose, whether through conflict or reconciliation.
Crown officials could hardly complain about their withdrawal, for the Old English could still
point to their role as a safeguard for the English authorities as a mark of their continued loyalty.
For these reasons, there was no love lost between the Old English and the native or
“mere” or “Gaelic” Irish. Each was highly suspicious of the other and held the other race in
contempt, and the animosity between the two was not lost on onlookers. Even as late as 1614,
government official, George Carew, remarked that “the Old English race despised the mere Irish,
accounting them a barbarous people, void of civility and religion.”12 The Irish equally loathed
the Old English. In the years surrounding 1641, it was not uncommon to hear them say that the
“Old English of the Pale [the area where the Old English were most heavily
concentrated]…deserved to be hanged as well as the other English.”13 Each group regarded the
other, across their differences, with antagonism.
Over time, however, the lines between a native Irish identity and an Old English one
blurred, and unsurprisingly, considering the proximity in which the two groups lived and the
length of time that they cohabited the island. Intermarriage, shared educational institutions, and a
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shared Catholic faith drew the two races culturally together.14 These similarities explain why the
New English, especially the government officials, came to regard the Old English with disdain.
They viewed the Old English as having abandoned their English heritage to become something
no better than a native Irishman instead. In turn, these views explain why the Old English, who
had traditionally enjoyed more royal favor than the Irish, began to see their privileges disappear
as well. The authority, confidence, and influence that the Old English had held for so long was
gradually transferred to the New English through their displacement of the Old English lords in
government offices and the support of the English administration.15 Soon they began to
experience the same political and economic discrimination as the native Irish. Their shared bonds
of Catholicism, culture, history, and political discrimination led the Old English and the Gaelic
Irish to put aside their differences and ally in the years of the rebellion. However, it is significant
to note that both parties were very clear on the nature of their cooperation as an alliance, not as a
union of the two groups.16 Nonetheless, the common cause of the Old English and the native
Irish united them in a group now known as the “Confederate Catholics,” who would in turn
become the “Confederation of Kilkenny.” The matter was settled with the Confederate Catholics
official view that the problems of Ireland and the Irish belonged to all who were born there.17
From then on, the Old English and the native Irish became virtually indistinguishable, as they
were all native to Ireland. It is no wonder, then, that the same rage, resentment, and utter
desperation began to build up in the hearts of all Catholic landowners against the flood of
Protestant (or New English) settlers.
Their reaction is hardly unreasonable, as they watched helplessly while their compatriots’
land was also dispossessed and their own positions deteriorated with the unrestricted tide of
incoming Protestant settlers. Aiden Clarke, in his essay, “The Genesis of the Ulster Rising of
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1641,” notes that the lords feared a repressive change in the Crown’s official attitude towards
Catholics and Catholicism. He credits the radical shift in the balance of political power in Ireland
that occurred as a direct result of the influx of Protestant settlers as the basis of their fears.18
Interestingly, Catholics still outnumbered Protestants by about fifteen to one, even as late as
1641.19 However, the Irish lords’ fears of anti-Catholic rhetoric and legislation were justified not
because of the Protestants demographic power but their economic and political power. Between
1603 and 1633, Protestant settler interest came to dominate political administration, and by 1641,
nearly 40% of profitable land in Ireland was possessed by English or Scottish landowners.20
With this dramatic increase in Protestant power in Ireland, the cries for regulations
against Catholics began to grow louder and more numerous. Some even went so far as to label
the Catholic Church antichristian. George Downham (or Downame), the bishop of Derry from
1617-1634, wrote a two volume book explaining how and why the Pope was the antichrist. In it,
he said, “recusant papists ought not to be favoured or spared…And surely if not their persons,
then much less ought their Anti-christian religion…be tolerated in the church of Christ. For what
fellowship can there be between light and darkness?”21 By declaring all Catholics to be heretics,
worse, servants of the antichrist, Downham essentially said that anything done to hinder them
was not only in defense of the true “church of Christ,” but a sacred and moral duty upon all
Protestants. Other sources indicate that Downham’s speech reflected such widely asserted beliefs
among Protestants in Ireland and England that he did not even fear repeating it to the king,
whose Catholic sympathies were widely known.22 These sympathies ensured that Protestants in
England and Ireland held the state responsible for saving the Catholics from their false faith,
“which hazardeth the souls of those it seizeth upon.”23 Consequently, English officials in Ireland
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responded to this immense popular pressure by extending the plantation policy and levying
recusancy fines (charges imposed on Catholics who refused to attend Anglican services).24
While the effects of the plantation policies and the anti-Catholic rhetoric that
predominated in the years before 1641 provided the key motives for the Irish to rebel, the future
of the leaders rebellion, such as Sir Phelim O’Neill and Lord Connor MacGuire, had their own
personal reasons. Individual debt was a significant factor for several of them. Randall
MacDonnell, the earl of Antrim and one of the earliest lords to push for rebellion, was £50,000 in
debt, and considering that his estate only produced an annual income of £6,000, it is no wonder
that he wished to see more of the profitable land in Ireland return to Irish hands. Sir Phelim and
Lord MacGuire were also in debt, though they do not appear to have owed as much as
MacDonnell.25
More infuriating for the lords’ than the new economic system produced by the plantation
system were the special rules that accompanied it. These rules prevented the Irish from
competing in the new market on the same footing as their Protestant counterparts, making it even
more difficult for them to overcome their debt. For example, the Irish were not allowed to
purchase land from English or Scottish landowners or each other.26 Simply put, the law forbade
the Irish from purchasing land period. This restriction greatly impeded the Irish from paying off
their debts, increasing their indebtedness. At some point, it became inevitable that the debt would
so great that they would be forced to sell their land, and only Protestant settlers were allowed to
purchase their land. Policies such as these not only led to the Protestant acquisition of 40% of
profitable land but also heavily influenced the Irish leaders’ decision to rebel.
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The Catholic gentry had reasons had reasons that were not based on material
consideration, however. Some truly seemed to have been genuinely concerned with improving
conditions for Irish laymen across the country: Hugh MacMahon of Monaghan, for example,
stated that the fundamental purpose of rebelling was to liberate all Irish men from the “bondage
and slavery” of the English.27 However, even MacMahon’s noble aspirations may well have
been second thought. Owen Connolly, MacMahon’s foster brother (who would later betray the
lords’ plot to the English authorities), reported that MacMahon originally enlisted in the
conspiracy out of fury at being slighted by a New English (as the Protestant settlers and officials
were called) justice of the peace.28 Apparently, resentment among the Irish landowners against
the pretentious New English was common. Thus, monetary issues and native pride were arguably
more important in ensuing the Catholic gentry’s commitment to the uprising than the general
plight of the native Irish.
Time was running out for the Catholic landowners. If they had any hope of holding on to
the two main components of their livelihood and, more importantly, their identity, as formed by
land and religion, the Irish lords were going to have to act and act quickly. Therefore, when their
neighbors, the Scots, successfully negotiated new terms of religious and political freedoms with
the Crown in 1640, the Irish gentry came to a decision.29 The drain of their lifeblood required
action.
Premeditation: the planning of the Ulster uprising
On the weekend of October 22/23, 1641, astonishment raced throughout the English
commonwealth of Ireland as a small group of discontented native Catholic landowners in Ulster
challenged English Protestant control “in hopes to rescue themselves from subjection to the
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crown of England.”30 The result was what one anonymous author reported as, “the most
barbarous and bloody rebellion that was ever known,” and it would last until 1653.31 The plan
was for Owen Roe O’Neill, Lord Connor MacGuire (the second baron of Enniskillen and
nephew of Owen Roe), Philip MacHugh O'Reilly, Turlough O'Neill, and Hugh MacMahon of
Monaghan to recruit as many of their friends and neighbors as possible (or at least those present
in the counties in which they resided) in an effort to regain confiscated Catholic lands, rights, and
privileges. Equally important was their supplementary goal to regain greater religious toleration
for the Catholic faith. They were successful in garnering support; sources indicate that Sir
Phelim O’Neill (brother of Turlough O’Neill) Patrick Madder O’Donnelly, and even members of
the Catholic clergy became involved in the plot as well.32 With the support of their fellow
Irishmen for the plot, they were to "send for the Irish in the low-countries and Spain"33 and let
them know the agreed upon date and time so that those Irish could "be over with them by that
day, or soon after, with supply of arms and ammunition."34 On the chosen day, all the
participants were to ride out and gather as many arms as they could muster in their own land
before arriving in Ireland.
By also including the Irish who lived abroad in the rebellion, the leaders hoped to catch
international attention, particularly of France and Spain (the two most powerful Catholic nations
in Europe at the time). They did have solid reasons for this hope. France had showed special
interest in Ireland ever since the union of the Scottish and English kingdoms in 1603, which
increased the power of England’s threat to French interests. Spain went even further in its
interest; in 1601, Philip III had sent expeditionary forces to aid in Hugh O’Neill’s uprising in an
attempt to diver English attention and resources from the Netherlands. Therefore, the Irish
leaders sent diplomatic envoys to both countries early in the rebellion, hoping to gain external
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recognition of their actions. They were refused. Neither France nor Spain even accepted the Irish
diplomats or granted them ambassadorial status, for it posed too many problems for France and
Spain with other European nations at that moment in time.35 In the end, the native Catholic
leaders could only rely on themselves.
Of all the Irish gentry involved, there appear to have been two main leaders: Owen Roe
O’Neill and Sir Phelim O’Neill. Owen Roe was the nephew and successor of the infamous Hugh
O’Neill, earl of Tyrone, who used his military prowess and the centralization of his regional
power base to unite the northern Irish leaders in opposing English advances during the Nine
Years’ War (1594-1603) during Elizabeth I’s reign.36 As a young man, Owen Roe served under
his uncle, and when Hugh fled to Europe, Owen left his homeland in exile and spent half his life
abroad as a result. However, he observed firsthand the failure of his uncle and how to avoid the
same mistakes. He would put these lessons in communication, cooperation, and coexistence
among Ireland’s Catholics to effective use in the rising of 1641. On the other hand, Sir Phelim
O’Neill, though related to Owen Roe, came to prominence in this new planned uprising through
a different path. In addition to being a landowner, Sir Phelim served as a trained lawyer, a justice
of the peace, and a member of the parliament in County Armagh, where he lived.37 Through
these experiences, Sir Phelim became a savvy politician and was adept at formulating the
demands of the Irish landed gentry while minimizing their perceived threat to the English. For
example, if they believed O’Neill’s profession of loyalty to the king, the English might be
disarmed and violence avoided.
When this group decided to challenge the English, they determined that their main target
would be Dublin Castle, one of the central strongholds of English power in the area. Surprise
would be their greatest weapon, as they hoped for a bloodless coup. This hope was so strong that
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they did not overlook even the smallest details: the specific day chosen for the attack on Dublin
(October 23, a Saturday) was a market day. Temple, who lived in Ireland for most of his life,
commented after the fact that in all of the commotion of a typical market day, “there would be
less notice taken of [the rebels] up and down the streets.”38 At the same time, they targeted other
English sites in and around Ulster, including garrisons, forts, and castles. Some of these attacks
would happen on the eve of the strike on Dublin Castle in order to cut Dublin off from any
possible aid the next day39. To ensure the best chances for successful take-overs, deception was
key. For example, Sir Phelim O’Neill wrested control of the Charlemont fort in County Armagh
from Toby, Lord Caulfield (the governor of the fort) by introducing himself as an uninvited
dinner guest while his servants used their concealed weaponry to overpower the guards.40 To
attack Dublin Castle, the Catholic lords decided that they would enlist the aid of several military
leaders, including Colonel Hugh Byrne, Colonel Richard Plunkett, and Captain Brian O’Neill.
They would gather as many men under their command as possible and then, as Temple reports,
“seize on the castle of Dublin, and with the arms found there, arm their soldiers and have them
ready for any action that should be commanded them.”41 However, it is important to note that the
plotters explicitly intended to avoid violence; military leaders had instructions to take prisoners
and treat them with care whenever possible. They were only to engage the English and Scottish
settlers in combat when not doing so would endanger the Irish.42
It was a well-thought-out plan, but the lords did not spend years upon years lying in wait
to pounce upon the hapless English at the first sign of weakness, as Temple claims. Documents
indicate instead that the chief leaders took the first steps towards developing the Ulster uprising
as late as February of 1641. 43 But even those steps were hardly steps at all, as even the key
figures of the revolt were not yet involved. The earliest conspirators assembled again in May, but
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did not make much progress. Even as late as August 1641, there was no real plot to speak of.44
Obviously, the Ulster uprising was hardly the long-standing, sinister plot that Temple alleged.
The Catholic gentry merely moved to press their advantage in any opportunity in 1641. Chief
among these advantages were the English presence at Dublin Castle and the recent Scottish
model of rebellion; the Catholic lords hoped that by securing possession of Dublin Castle and the
surrounding English posts in the area, they would attain a position of strength from which to
negotiate their demands with the Crown. This strategy had already proven successful for the
Scots when they captured Newcastle in August of 1640. 45 They then successfully parlayed with
Charles I to gain toleration of their religion. (Charles had forcefully tried to implement a new
English Book of Prayer upon the Scottish Presbyterians through the force of arms.)
Indeed, the Scots’ capture of Newcastle was important to the Irish revolt. The plotters
were well aware that the Scots’ success gave them an opportunity to take advantage of the
resulting political turmoil in England. (Charles I’s continual conflicts with Parliament, which
stretched back as far as the 1620s, had left England divided as a power struggle between
Parliament and the King began to emerge.46) There were, however, important differences in the
circumstances of the Scots’ and those of the Irish lords’. The Irish did not have a homogenous
population to rouse for support. Instead, they had to contend with the significant presence of
English and Scottish settlers in Ireland as a result of the plantation system begun by James I.
Thus, one of the biggest threats to the success of the Irish mission would not come from enemies
foreign but those domestic.
Evidence indicates that the Catholic leaders were not ignorant of the precariousness of
their position. In a letter addressed to Sir William Stewart, a leading Scottish planter in Ulster
and member of the Irish privy council, four of the O’Neill lords involved in the plan (but not Sir
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Phelim) assured Stewart that they had no intention “to hurt any of his majesty’s subjects either of
the English or the Scottish nation either in body or goods.”47 Sir Phelim would go even farther in
his magnanimity, promising in his proclamation from Dungannon on October 24 that no
Englishman or Scots would come to harm and that they would receive compensation for any
damage done to persons or property as a result of the Irish lords’ efforts.48 Had that promise been
kept by all who took part in the rising, the Irish gentry might well have succeeded in gaining the
support (or at least maintaining the neutrality) of the English and the Scots in Ireland, and the
outcome of the rebellion might have been very different.
Pandemonium: the unleashing of Irish fury and the resulting English reactions
Unfortunately for Owen Roe, Sir Phelim, and their allies, such a peaceful transition of
power was not meant to be. Similar to the opening of Pandora’s Box, the Catholic lords
unleashed a great many evils into the land when they stormed English fortifications in the form
of the Irish masses, though, if their earlier statements can be trusted, they had no intention of
causing those evils. These evils, according to Protestant testimonies, included stripping victims
of their clothes and leaving them to freeze to death in the harsh Irish winter, robbing Protestant
families of their material goods and ransacking their homes for important papers, such as deeds
to land and statements of Catholics’ debt, torturing English and Scottish alike if they refused to
reveal where they hid their valuables, etc. etc.49
What prompted the Irish populace to commit such vicious acts against their Protestant
neighbors? Economic conditions were poor for all Irish Catholics in 1641, but none were poorer
than those at the lowest levels of society―craftsmen, laborers, and small farmers. Ireland had
suffered from political turmoil for several years before 1641, leaving many areas severely
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economically depressed. Even those areas that had managed to escape the economic downturns
of those unstable years (such as County Meath) suffered in the years of peace afterwards: the
flood of poor and landless people into the more prosperous counties quickly exhausted the
locals’ abilities to meet their needs and the land through incessant tillage.50 With James I’s
confiscation of Catholic land (and its redistribution into English and Protestant possession), even
more low-level Irish joined the throng of landless and unemployed drifters. This spike in poverty
increased the level of Irish debt exponentially, as they were forced to take out loans, often at
excessive interest rates, from their Protestant neighbors. These neighbors would subsequently
become their landlords as well, a fact that could have only rubbed salt into the native Irishmen’s
raw wounds. When these debts were combined with poor harvests and scarcity of resources
throughout Ireland in 1641, sectarian and nationalistic tensions became dangerously brittle. 51
Certain attitudes held by the more prosperous Protestants could not have helped to ease this
tension either: for them, a common explanation for the state of their Irish neighbors was in their
work ethic (a product of their Catholic faith). One witness reported, “The Irish [were] well
known to be a people both proud and envious…they [were] for the most part ignorant and
illiterate, lazy and poor, and [would] rather beg than work.”52 These words were not exactly the
kind that one would want lingering in the memories of those “proud and envious” people when
the law of the land was thrown into disarray.
Economic disparities were not the only reason that the Ulster uprising produced an
unintended level of violence. Evidence suggests that the Catholic lords overestimated the extent
of their control over their territories. For example, Sir Phelim O’Neill’s authority was primarily
over County Armagh. Though his proclamation from Dungannon makes it clear that he wanted
his men to treat the English and Scot settlers alike with clemency, the depositions of Protestant
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witnesses indicate that the Irish laymen showed a special hostility to English colonists.53 Given
the state of the Irish economy and the attitudes of the more prosperous English towards their
Irish neighbors, the selective enmity of O’Neill’s men is hardly surprising. Another part of the
lords’ loss of control resulted from their failure to capture Dublin Castle as planned. With the
central target of their operation still in British hands, the lords’ could not adequately coordinate
their attacks. Even a passing study of military history shows that an uncoordinated, undisciplined
army is a rabid army, and the Irish were no different. The failure to capture Dublin meant that the
uprising spread across Ireland in the form of unorganized, local raids.54
In addition, the spread of political thought questioning Catholics’ obligations to a
heretical king also helped to destabilize the Catholic lords’ control over their men. Conor
O’Mahony, an Irish Jesuit who taught at the university in Evora during the rebellion, wrote his
work, Disputatio apologetica de Iure Egni Hiberniae pro Catholicis Hibernis adversus haeretics
Anglos. Accessit eiusdem authoris ad eosdem Catholicos exhortation, in 1645.55 In Disputatio
Apologetica, O’Mahony undermined the previous statements of the leaders of the rebellion, who
had been staunchly proclaiming their continued loyalty to Charles II and their recognition of his
legitimate authority over Ireland. Obviously, the context in which those statements were
delivered meant that English Protestants would have inherently regarded them with suspicion. As
a result, the Catholic gentry were particularly intent on demonstrating the sincerity of their
claims through their humane treatment of the English and Scottish settlers. Thus, when
O’Mahony denied the legitimacy of the Stuarts as the kings of Ireland, and more importantly,
endorsed the annihilation of English “heretics,” the lords of the rebellion were hard pressed to
control their men or reconcile O’Mahony’s proclamations with their earlier avowals.56
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One should expect that the Catholic Church would have an opinion on the rising. After
all, the lay lords claimed that they fought for the benefit of the church and not just themselves.
The question then becomes, “What was the Church’s level of involvement?” Furthermore, when
O’Mahony challenged the legitimacy of the Stuart kings, did he reflect a common view in the
position of the Catholic churches, or was O’Mahony a lone voice in the wilderness?
The Catholic Church was clearly involved in the rebellion early on and in a myriad of
ways. For the most part, it played a constructive role. The most significant actors (lords, bishops,
gentry, and clergy) in the Ulster revolt formed what became known as the Confederation of
Kilkenny. In 1642, the Confederation drafted a constitution for the Catholic state of Ireland. In
this constitution, the power of the church over the goals, methods, and actors of the rebellion is
seen in the three articles that refer to it. The first article declared that the primary objective of the
uprising was to restore “the privileges and immunities [conceded to the Catholic Church]
according to the great charter…of King Henry III.”57 In the second article, the Confederation
created a council with the “power and authority to do and execute all manner of advancement of
the catholic cause.” In order to do so, the constitution also granted the council the power to
oversee and resolve all capital, criminal, or civil matters (except those that pertained to land titles
and/or rights).58 Finally, the Catholic Church settled its own score with the established Anglican
Church.
Those grievances were long standing immediately after the Protestant Reformation
arrived Ireland, the confiscation of the Catholic Church’s land and its redistribution to the
established Anglican Church soon followed. The clergy who formed part of the Confederation of
Kilkenny intended to reverse those acts through the last article of the constitution. In the course
of the rebellion, any possessions of the “protestant[s], in right of their respective churches, or
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their tenements… [would be] taken, and construed as the possession of the catholic[s] and their
tenements respectively.”59 The Catholic Church knew that the uprising represented its greatest
opportunity to reverse its steady marginalization by the influx of Protestant settlers and their antiCatholic policies.
The language of the constitution from the Confederation of Kilkenny would lead one to
believe that the Catholic Church aggressively pursued the destruction of Protestants in Ireland.
However, much like the lay lords who initially planned the rebellion, the Church knew that
violent measures against the English and Scottish settlers would do more harm than good. For
that reason, the majority of Catholic clergy played a moderating role throughout the revolt by
upbraiding their congregations for any unnecessary violence or cruelty against the Protestants
and by trying to protect fleeing Protestants from death and destruction. Several witnesses from
the time reported that they survived only because of the intervention of different Catholic priests.
These priests, at times, saved the Protestant refugees from undisciplined Irish military members,
or at other times, provided the Protestants with provisions after their narrow escape from
danger.60 Clearly, men like O’Mahony shared some thoughts with the overall body of Catholic
clergy but advocated a more extreme approach.
Despite the Catholic clergy and rebel leaders’ attempts to protect the Protestants, it is
undeniable that the Irish committed atrocious crimes against the English settlers. Hundreds of
people died as a result of the uprising. According to an anonymous author who reported on the
rebellion some years later, “multitudes of miserable English” were forced to “flock together in
cities, towns, and castles, leaving their…personal estates to the mercy of [the Irish].”61 Such
accounts offer some support for Temple’s condemnation of the rebels in his History.
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However, the English struck back, hard, and with unspeakable inhumanity. Oliver
Cromwell led the campaign to force Ireland to submit to complete English control. In his report
to the Speaker of the House of Commons following his capture of Drogheda (the last main
pocket of Irish resistance), Cromwell discussed his brutal tactics with a chilling, practical
reasoning. In order to “prevent the effusion of blood for the future,” Cromwell ordered his men
to set fire to the St. Peter’s Church in Drogheda, where approximately one hundred Irish rebels
had fled to in order to escape his army. Being “in the heat of action,” Cromwell was moved by
nothing, not even the scream of a man as he cried, “God confound me; I burn, I burn.”62 The
burning of the church was an afterthought, though; Cromwell had forbidden his men from
sparing the residents of Mill-Mount, a town nearby where rebels had sought shelter on account of
its excellent defenses, the night before. The defenses did not do much: Cromwell reported that
his soldiers put over 2,000 people to death, yet the sword proved to be a tool of mercy in his
hands. Those who managed to escape it were condemned to starvation or forced labor in
Barbados.63
The severity of Cromwell’s actions gave even the English pause. In 1649, Cromwell was
called before the House of Commons to explain his actions. Ever the military man, his reasons
were short and simple: for God and country. The rebellion had “imbrued [the rebels’] hands in so
much innocent [English] blood… [which was] satisfactory grounds to such actions.” In addition,
the Irish had grown “so insolent that…the Protestants were thrust out of the great church called
St. Peter’s, and they had public mass there.”64 In this statement, one sees how the conflicts
between the English and the Irish, though initiated as a struggle for economic and political
privileges, devolved into bitter sectarian divisions. The Irish forced the Protestants out of the
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church for their mere identity as Protestants. In return, Cromwell slaughtered the Irish for
expressing their Catholic faith.
To the English authorities’ credit, they appear to have sensed the danger in leaving IrishEnglish relations in the state brought on by Cromwell’s actions. After the rebellion was
suppressed, a commentator reported that English officials tried to bridge the gap between English
and Irish residents through a policy of official clemency and land restoration. According to this
anonymous author, “the English government did not inflict national punishments for those
national crimes…but on the contrary, restored nearly five million of English acres of land, to the
Irish papists.”65 There were stipulations, however. A declaration by the Lord Deputy of Ireland
and his council in 1655 ordained that any Irishman who hoped to submit a claim for this land had
to essentially submit to a background check to determine their level of involvement in the 1641
rebellion.66 Furthermore, when the English authorities decided to restore land to the Irish,
sources report that they made sure to keep a standing Protestant army in Ireland, to put all civil
and military power into the hands of English Protestants, and to “insert a clause…not to dispose
the considerable offices of trust, except to such as were de stirpe Anglicana [of the Anglican
race, emphasis original].”67 The English clearly had no intention of allowing the influential
leaders of Ireland anywhere near social or political power again. Thus, in a sense, the Catholic
lords were both successful in accomplishing the goals of their rebellion and thwarted in their
efforts at the same time.
While the actions of the lords’ clearly improved the lot of the native Irish multitudes, the
same could not be said for the leaders themselves. The main reason that the plot to take control
of Dublin Castle failed was because the Catholic lords were betrayed just prior to the attack. On
the eve of the assault on Dublin, Owen Connolly (or O’ Connolly), a poor tenant farmer,
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divulged the plot to the Lord Justice at the time, Sir William Parsons.68 Connolly swore that his
foster brother, Hugh Oge MacMahon of Monaghan, had summoned him to aid in the takeover of
Dublin Castle and that he had tried to talk MacMahon out of the plot. When he failed to persuade
MacMahon, Connolly approached Sir William out of great “faith and loyalty” to the Crown “to
his own danger” and warned him of the impending attack. Connolly’s actions earned a glowing
report from Temple, who argued that it was only by his actions that “there [was] yet hope left us
of deliverance of this state and kingdom, from the wicked purposes of those conspirators.”69
When the element of surprise disappeared, the lords’ lost their chance to gain Dublin Castle and,
thus, their ability to emulate the Scots’ negotiation with Charles I. In the aftermath, everyone
who was suspected of colluding with the plot and/or the plotters was rapidly arrested and
imprisoned.70 After the rebellion was permanently put down in the late 1640s, many were
subsequently tried in England and convicted of treason. For example, Temple spent a significant
portion of his History covering the trial of Lord MacGuire.
One wonders what motivated Connolly to turn. While Nicholas P. Canny (in Making
Ireland British, 1580-1650) speculates that perhaps it was because he had recently converted to
Protestantism,71 it is far more likely, as Temple argued, that Connolly hoped by his actions to
gain “some mark of his majesty’s most royal bounty, which [would] largely extend to him and
his posterity.” 72 This bounty, as Temple reports, came in the form of £500 upfront and £200
pension annually until he could be allotted inheritable land of greater value and would have been
an irresistible siren’s call to a poor tenant farmer.73
Though the failure to capture Dublin proved a major setback for the Irish lords’ plans,
they were not yet defeated. Instead they again took advantage of the political situation in
England to try to negotiate with the Crown from a position of strength. Charles I was still reeling
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from his embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Scots in 1639-1640 when the Catholic lords’
launched their own rebellion in 1641. 74 In response, Charles I called parliament (now known as
the Long Parliament) into session to raise the troops and funds he needed to put down the
rebellion. But the Long Parliament refused, and as a result, England slid into civil war between
the royalists and the parliamentarians between 1641 and 1643. The so-called “War of the Three
Kingdoms” was a golden opportunity for the native Irish leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to
the English Crown, and as early as 1643, the Catholic gentry called for a temporary truce.75
These actions are hardly those of men who planned for the ultimate destruction of England, as
Temple alleged in his History. In fact, it appears that the Irish, at least the Irish lords, were
genuine when they said they only wanted to protect themselves from the further marginalization
of their land and religion.
That is not to say that the Catholic leaders naively intended to put themselves at further
risk of death and destruction. They were very canny in the way they offered their assistance. As
Jerrold I. Casway wrote, the Irish leaders, “wanted to demonstrate [their] loyalty and reconcile
[their] differences with the king,” but it was going to cost Charles I restoration of “civil and
religious liberty” for the Catholics.76 While Temple likely would have labeled these demands
treasonous and heretical, it appears that Charles I did not feel the same. Casway further reports
that Charles I was more than willing to mend relations with his Catholic subjects through welltimed compromises and discreet negotiations.77 With a civil war before him, Charles I would had
to have been mad, arrogant, foolish, or all three, to turn away any potential allies, though,
granted, it did mean balancing reconciling with his Catholic subjects while not offending his
Protestant subjects.
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Once again, had things gone according to the Irish gentry’s plans, the full realization of
their goals might have been possible. Unfortunately for them, neither they nor the royalists took
Oliver Cromwell’s military skill (or his calculated attitude of victory at all costs, depending on
who is describing him) seriously enough. Cromwell emerged on the side of the parliamentarians
in the civil war, who intended to settle the Irish question once and for all. Following Elizabeth I’s
model (which had proven successful in Ireland before), the parliamentarians sought to gain rapid
victory in Ireland in order to not allow their enemies time to mobilize. To that end, the Long
Parliament set up a subsidy assessment and a coordinating commission whose purpose was to
assemble a massive army pulled from all three of the British kingdoms (England, Scotland, and
Ireland). With this ready supply of men, and more importantly, cash, Cromwell began his Irish
campaign.78 The result was bloodshed like that evinced by Cromwell’s capture of Drogheda but
implemented on a national scale. Even important leaders warned against the conflict. Shortly
before his death in 1649, Owen Roe O’Neill implored James Butler, the Marquis of Ormond and
the royal representative in Ireland, not to confront Cromwell. O’Neill argued that directly
engaging Cromwell with the small number of troops that Ormond possessed would “produce no
other effect than the loss of your Excellency and consequently of the whole kingdom.”79 He
fervently reminded Ormond that the Irish army was the only force standing between Cromwell
and Ireland’s fall into the hands of Parliament. By August 1650, the Irish Catholic army lost both
their faith in Ormond as a commander and their will to continue fighting. 80 The Cromwellian
conquest of Ireland was complete.
Concluding Remarks: the authenticity of Temple’s evaluation of the Ulster rebellion
The fall of Ireland into Parliament’s hands provokes one to assess the veracity of
Temple’s accusations against the Irish. Among his most radical allegations, Temple claimed that
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raising “strong armies to invade and conquer England” was a part of the original plan for the
Ulster uprising.81 If that had truly been the case, the Catholic lords would not have called a truce
when England descended into civil war between 1641 and 1643 nor offered to fight on the side
of the king. Had the Irish actually have had any desire to raid England and take control, there
would have been no better time to do so than when its military and political unity was shattered.
In fact, the Ulster rebellion was a movement for religious liberation and political and economic
freedoms, not aggressive expansion. Temple also maintained that the Catholic lords had spent
years planning the Ulster uprising. If the Irish gentry had truly intended to raid and occupy
England, then such protracted planning would have been essential, for England was an
economically, politically, and militarily powerful nation, especially compared to Ireland.
However, the leaders of the rebellion did not even conceive a serious plan for the rebellion until
one month prior to the event. That fact, when combined with the religious, political, and
economic nature of the rebellion, refutes any reasonable claim that the Irish schemed for any
great length of time or wanted to overthrow England.
Similarly, when Temple denies that the Irish lords had any provocation for their
rebellion, he conveniently overlooks the position that the lords found themselves in prior to
October 1641. James I’s confiscation of Catholics’ land, the transplantation system, and the
passage of discriminatory laws against Catholics that prevented them from equally participating
in the Irish economy worked to strip the Irish of the land that they had lived on and worked for
centuries. In addition, the anti-Catholic rhetoric that was passed down to the English settlers
from the Anglican clergy created a hostile atmosphere toward a fundamental source of the
Irishmen’s identity: their religion. These factors, combined with the economic depression that
ravaged Ireland in the decade before the 1641 revolt (years in which the level of poverty and
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debt among all Irish escalated exponentially while their Protestant neighbors enjoyed relative
prosperity), makes it surprising that the Irish lords and clergy showed as much restraint as they
did. Obviously, Temple’s heritage as an English Protestant official prevented him from even
trying to understand or empathize with the Irishmen’s plight when they turned to rebellion as a
last resort.
However, not all of Temple’s allegations are so easily refuted. In his History, Temple
charges the Irish with arranging the massacre of English and Scot Protestants from the very
inception of the rebellion. One can examine the statements of the leaders and see that they do not
support Temple’s accusation, but an absence of available evidence makes it impossible to tell
what the leaders truly thought. One can, however, weigh the costs and benefits of the mass
murders to determine the likelihood of Temple’s claim. Ultimately, the mass murder of
Protestant settlers undermined the Irish lords’ profession of loyalty to Charles II, losing them
potential royal support. In addition, the violence invoked the English resentment and retaliation
that the Catholic lords had hoped to avoid, costing them the bloodless coup they had worked so
hard to obtain. If the Irish gained any advantages by the bloodshed, they were limited to the
execution of personal vengeances and the acquisition of support for the revolt from the Irish
populace. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Irish Catholics would have included widespread
slaughter of their English and Scot neighbors in their original plan.
Lastly, Temple accuses the Irish Catholics of an inhuman level of cruelty against their
hapless Protestant victims. He has some justification for this accusation because the Irish
populace undeniably committed atrocities against the English and Scot settlers, according to the
thousands of Protestant depositions. However, Temple’s History does not take into account the
Cromwellian reconquest and the appalling carnage that accompanied the suppression of the
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uprising, particularly the capture of Drogheda in 1649. If Cromwell’s capture of Ireland for the
Long Parliament did not exceed the attacks committed by the Irish, then it matched them to say
the very least. Thus, Temple’s accusation is in one sense very true; the Irish did commit dreadful
acts of violence against their Protestant neighbors, but the capture of Drogheda shows that the
English had no qualms in using similar cruelty.
Temple’s work was influential in shaping official English foreign policy concerning
Ireland, the general English audience’s understanding of the Irish, and the resulting stereotypes
of the Irish for many years. The tragedy is that such a misleading work became so influential.
The danger is that it could continue to mislead. Taken out of its context, Temple’s work gives a
heavily biased and incomplete understanding of the Ulster rebellion in 1641. However, when
carefully examined within its context, The History of the General Rebellion in Ireland is an
invaluable source for studying any number of historical subjects (the transplantation system, the
history of English-Irish relations, the War of the Three Kingdoms, Ireland’s Catholic identity,
etc. etc.). Examining the Irish rebellion in 1641 in the three phases, provocation, premeditation,
and pandemonium, especially in relation to Temple’s History, places Temple’s work within its
historical framework and thus illuminates its potential for the intrigued reader to understand the
Irish rebellion better.
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